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FUNCTIONAL DISCOUNTS: A LEGAL-ECONOMIC
CONCEPT PERMITTING NEW EXPERIMENTS
IN DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS*
John T. Soma**
It has been stated that "in today's dynamic economy, mar-
keting, rather than production, is the most crucial aspect of the
manufacturer's business; experimentation and innovation in dis-
tribution techniques are its most outstanding characteristics."'
In response to the increase in importance of marketing over pro-
duction, there has been a proliferation of new marketing tech-
niques such as discount mass merchandising, spot television ad-
vertising, and boutique merchandising.2 One method of creat-
ing the opportunity to experiment with these new marketing tech-
niques is through the use of functional discounts. An example
of a functional discount will help explain the concept. Assume
a manufacturer has traditionally produced and totally packaged
a product before shipping the product to a wholesaler. The
manufacturer may find that it is more economical to have the
wholesaler perform the final packaging. For the performance
of this job or function, the manufacturer grants the wholesaler a
discount.' The discount is called a functional discount. A func-
tional discount, therefore, is a price concession granted by the
* This article is based on the author's masters thesis in Economics. The
writer wishes to acknowledge the suggestions and advice of Professors Richard
Arnould, Dwight Flanders, and Thomas Friedland, Department of Economics,
University of Illinois, and Professor Glen Weston, George Washington Univer-
sity School of Law. The author, however, bears full responsibility for the con-
tents and conclusions of this article.
** J.D., University of Illinois, 1973; M.A., Economics, University of Illi-
nois, 1973; Ph.D. candidate in Economics, University of Illinois; Research Assist-
ant for the Center for Advanced Computation, Urbana, Illinois.
1. Jones, Marketing Strategy and Government Regulation in Dual Distribu-
tion Practices, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 456 (1966).
2. See generally E. CUNDIFF & R. STILL, BASIC MARKETING 103 (2d ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as CJNDIFF].
3. See generally Kelley, Functional Discounts Under the Robinson-Patman
Act, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 526 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Kelley, Functional Dis-
counts]; Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look
at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929 (1951); Van Use, Functional Prices, in
CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT SYMPOSIUM 89 (1947).
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seller to the buyer for services performed by the buyer for the
seller.4
Through the use of functional discounts, a manufacturer can
"buy distribution" in various distribution channels by accepting
different profit levels from varying classes of customers who
represent these different channels. 5  For instance, the manufac-
turer may simultaneously sell directly to mass discount merchan-
disers, spot advertise on television to create a national market for
traditional retailers, and sell to newly established jobbers servic-
ing boutique shops.
When a functional discount is granted by a seller to a buyer
for services performed by the buyer for the seller, there is invari-
ably a difference between the economic and legal interpretation
of the transaction. The critical problem of functional discounts
involves the discrepancies which exist in the case law between
the economic and legal definitions of injury caused by functional
discounts. This article will focus on distribution systems, and
in particular the interplay between the economic and legal defi-
nitions of injury caused by functional discounts under section
2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.' The article will then demon-
strate that the present functional discount case law hinders, rather
than encourages, new experiments in marketing structures which
could increase competition across traditional channels of distribu-
tion.
4. A function can be defined as an act, operation, or service performed
in the process of distributing goods or services which requires the expenditure
of economic resources, and the performance of which is rewarded by some type
of economic compensation. See P. CONVERSE, H. HuEGY & R. MITCHELL, ELE-
MENTs OF MARKETING 126 (7th ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as CONVERSE].
5. C. DAVISSON, THE MARKETINO OF AUTOMOTIVE PARTS 910 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as DAVISSON].
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 13(a) (1970). The main provisions of the Robinson-
Patman Act are found in section 1 of that act. However, they were originally
sections "2(a)", "2(f)", etc., of the Clayton Act and thus are generally called
sections "2(a)", "2(f)", etc., of the Robinson-Patman Act. The relevant provi-
sions are:
Section 2(a). That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly,
to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities oflike grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases involvedin such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are soldfor use, consumption, or resale . . . and where the effect of such dis-
crimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to cre-
ate a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or pre-
vent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly re-
ceives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of
them:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials
which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufac-
ture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantitiesin which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered.
[Vol. 14
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FUNCTIONAL DIsCOUNTs
While the need for functional discounts and their existence
has been recognized and accepted by the economic community,
little has been done to facilitate their acceptance through legisla-
tion. The House version of the Robinson-Patman Act originally
included an allowance for price differentials based on functional
duties.7  The Senate-House Conference Committee, however,
eliminated all references to any functional or trade discount ex-
emptions without explanatory comment.' The primary reason for
this omission was that at the time of passage of the Act, the
traditional wholesaler-jobber-retailer chain of distribution was the
normal method of distribution,' and under this method, functional
discounts were not needed. The supplier normally sold only
to wholesalers based on trade discounts. Channels of distribu-
tion, however, have changed greatly since the original passage of
the Robinson-Patman Act. As the Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral's National Commission stated, modem marketing structure
has changed so much that "this proliferation of modem market-
ing units defies neat nomenclature and descriptive labels."' 0
In the early 1960's one-day hearings were held before the
House Committee on the Judiciary (Antitrust Subcommittee) to
amend the Robinson-Patman Act to allow functional discounts
as a defense to price discrimination charges." Both the Jus-
tice Department and the Federal Trade Commission, while favor-
ing the principle of functional discounts, opposed the specific
bills and they died in committee.' 2 At present, therefore, there
is a dearth of statutory language incorporating functional dis-
counts into present law although the need exists to codify this
modem approach to merchandising.
JUDICIAL HISTORY OF FUNCTIONAL DIsCoUNTs
Functional discounts have been implicitly accepted in the
7. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1936).
8. H.R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 6 (1936). See also C. Aus-
TIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION & RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT 52 (2d ed. 1959).
9. In speculating as to why the functional discounts provisions were
dropped from the original Robinson-Patman Act, one authority has stated that
farm cooperatives did not want to jeopardize their special status in receiving dis-
counts, and thus wanted the then present (1930's) case law to remain intact.
C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 25 n.8 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as EDWARDS, PRICE DISCRIMINATION].
10. THE REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITrEE TO
STUDY THE ANnamRusT LAws 204 (1955) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
11. H.R. REP. No. 2170, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
12. BNA ANTITRUST TRADE REo. REP., Aug. 22, 1961, at A-6; Sept. 5, 1961,
at A-1; Sept. 25, 1962, at A-7.
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case law.'" In Standard Oil v. FTC, 4 the major case of func-
tional discounts, the issue of jobber classification, and thus func-
tional discounts, never reached the Supreme Court due to proce-
dural changes at each level of the case. While the Supreme Court
has never dealt with the issue, the Federal Trade Commission rec-
ognized functional discounts in dictum in Doubleday & Co., 5 con-
cluding that without functional discounts, competition and mar-
keting efficiency is thwarted, and consumers are forced to pay
higher prices. Through the use of the discounts, the seller can
shift various distribution functions to his customers, thereby in-
creasing market efficiency.
The concept of functional discounting has found approval
from various sectors of the legal profession. The chief sponsor
of the Robinson-Patman Act 6 stated that functional discounts
are implicitly included in the Act," and the Attorney General's
Commission has also accepted the concept of functional dis-
counts. 8 Within The Report of the Attorney General's Na-
tional Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, however, the dis-
sent preferred to limit functional discounts to only those distribu-
tors who resell their goods as wholesalers, on the grounds that
the middleman assumes the risk, investment and costs solely to
this extent.'" Economically, functional discounts exist in the
13. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952). In Empire Rayon Yarn Co.
v. American Viscose Corp., 364 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1002 (1967), the court of appeals ruled that the validity of functional discounts
had to be judged under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, rather than
under section 2(c). Section 2(c) would have rendered all functional discounts
illegal per se due to its strict prohibition of brokerage or commission payments
to any purchaser or parties related to the purchaser.
14. 41 F.T.C. 263 (1945), modified, 43 F.T.C. 56 (1946), modified and at 'd,
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949), modified by FTC Com-
mission, January 16, 1953, certified to 7th Cir., March 26, 1953, remanded for
want of jurisdiction to FTC Commission, January 18, 1954, reconsideration denied
by FTC Commission, January 7, 1955, appealed, 233 F.2d 649 (1956), modified,
355 U.S. 396 (1958).
15. Doubleday & Co., 52 F.T.C. 169 (1955). The Doubleday decision also
weakened the strong stand the FTC has taken on functional discounts by holding:
In our view, to relate functional discounts solely to the purchaser's
method of resale [price by use rule] without recognition of his buying
function thwarts competition and efficiency in marketing, and inevit-
ably leads to higher consumer prices.
Id. at 209 (1955).
16. The true author of the Robinson-Patman Act was "Judge" Teegarden.
Rep. Patman even declared "Mr. Teegarden wrote this bill ....... Hearings Be-fore the House Committee on the Judiciary on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act,
74 Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 27-28 (1935). See also F. RowE, PRICE DIscRIMINATION
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 12 (1962) [hereinafter cited as RowE,
1962].
17. W. PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 29(1963) [hereinafter cited as PATMAN].
18. REPORT, supra note 10, at 207.
19. Id. at 209.
[Vol. 14
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market place; they are legally sanctioned because there is no di-
rect prohibition to their use. This legal existence, however, is
based on a judicial interpretation of the Act rather than specific
statutory language.
LEGAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND INJURY
In order to understand legal price discrimination under the
Robinson-Patman Act it is best to begin with the Act itself.
Section 2(a) states:
That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in com-
merce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or in-
directly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers
of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any
of the purchasers involved in such discrimination are in com-
merce, where such commodities are sold for use, consump-
tion, or resale . . . and where the effect of such discrimina-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy or prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimina-
tion, or with customers of either of them .... 20
In essence, section 2(a) prohibits a seller from making inter-
state sales to two or more different customers of commodities of
like grade and quality at price differences which produce a com-
petitive injury.21  A prima facie case of price discrimination re-
quires the following elements: (1) a seller; (2) in interstate
commerce; (3) to two or more different purchasers; (4) of com-
modities; (5) of like grade and quality; (6) at a price differ-
ence; (7) which produces a competitive injury. 22 The plaintiff
has the burden of proving these seven elements in price discrimi-
nation cases, but once proved, the plaintiff has shown a prima
facie violation of section 2(a).
Knowledge of each necessary element is essential to an un-
derstanding of functional discounts. First, one seller must make
two sales. A problem typically arises when a parent corporation
and its sales subsidiary offer the same commodity for sale at dif-
ferent prices. For example, in Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Philco
Corp.23 an individual retail dealer was quoted a higher price by
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 13(a) (1970).
21. See generally Blackford, A Survey of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 285, 287 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Blackford, Survey].
22. Id.
23. 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1957). See Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d
13 (3d Cir. 1956); Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 176 F.2d
1 (7th Cir. 1949); Frank Miles v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1973-2 CCH TRADE
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Philco's sales subsidiary than Philco was offering to a large pur-
chaser. Despite the ownership of the subsidiary by Philco, the
court dismissed the complaint because the sales of the subsidiary
were not attributed to the parent.2 4
Second, the interstate commerce requirement of the Robin-
son-Patman Act requires that one of the two sales creating the
price discrimination occur in interstate commerce. 25  By contrast,
the Sherman Act and Clayton Act only require that the transac-
tion affect interstate commerce. 26  The classic case dealing with
the commerce requirement is Standard Oil Co. v. FTC,27 in
which Standard Oil contended that the storage and sale of gasoline
in the same state deprived the gasoline of any interstate charac-
teristics. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and instead
applied a "flow of commerce" theory. Since the gasoline had
been refined in Indiana before shipment to Michigan for distri-
bution, the Court held that the movement of the gasoline across
state lines constituted a "flow of commerce", and thus, had ful-
filled the interstate commerce requirements of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act.28
Third, the two different purchasers requirement is simple:
there must be two or more independent legal entities purchasing
the commodity. The price at which an independent subsidiary
sells a commodity will not be attributed to its parent.
Fourth, the products sold must be commodities. This re-
quirement has assumed significance by confining the scope of
section 2(a) to tangible property.2" In General Shale Products
CASES 74,675, at 94,966 (E.D. Wis. May 18, 1973); FTC v. Edelmann & Co.,
51 F.T.C. 978 (1955).
24. The sale requirement excludes commercial arrangements such as leases
and consignments. See Students Book Co. v. Washington Law Book Co., 232
F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956); Gaylord Shops,
Inc. v. Pittsburgh Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc., 219 F.
Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1963). The two sales forming the price differential must
be relatively contemporaneous in time. Atlanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, 258 F.2d
365 (2d Cir. 1958).
25. Section 1 of the Clayton Act defines "commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 12(1970). The relevant provision states that "'Commerce', as used herein, means
trade or commerce among the several States and with foreign nations ....
26. D. BAUM, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: SUMMARY AND COMMENT 11-
13 (1964).
27. 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
28. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958). See generally Moore
v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954); Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co.,
1973-2 CCH TRADE CASES T 74,645, at 94, 834 (1973) (jurisdictional requirements
of Robinson-Patman Act mandate at least one interstate sale); Hiram Walker, Inc.
v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901(1969); Abramson v. Colonial Oil Co., 390 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 831 (1968); Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785 (10th Cir.
1967); BNA ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP., October 17, 1969, at B-1.
29. See, e.g., Fleetway, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Interstate Transp. Co., 72 F.2d
216 [Vol. 14
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v. Struck Construction Co.,"0 a discriminatory price for bricks
was included as part of a construction bid. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the price of
bricks was inseparable from the total bid, and as an indivisible
factor in the bid was thus not a commodity. In general, price
quotations which combine tangible elements with major intangible
elements (services) are not commodities within the meaning of
section 2(a).3' Advertising has also been held not to be a com-
modity under section 2(a).'2
Fifth, the two commodities sold must be of like grade and
quality. The legislative history of both the Clayton Act and
the Robinson-Patman Act fails to clarify the meaning of the phrase
"like grade and quality."33  The early interpretation of like grade
and quality was based on an examination of the physical proper-
ties of the two goods.3 4 Later, nonfunctional differences in ap-
pearance (such as minor changes in the rib design of spark plugs)
were accepted as differences in "like grade and quality." 5  The
Supreme Court in FTC v. Borden Co.,3 6 however, followed the
earlier interpretation, and held that the substance of the products
must be different if the product was to fall outside the scope of
the Robinson-Patman Act. In Borden, the Federal Trade Com-
mission charged that the price differential between Borden's pre-
mium brands and private brands violated section 2(a). Borden re-
sponded by saying that customer preference, promoted by Bor-
den's advertising of its premium brands, constituted a legal dif-
761 (3d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 626 (1935); Gaylord Shops, Inc. v.
Pittsburgh Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc., 219 F. Supp.
400 (W.D. Pa. 1963). Representative Patman offered the following interpreta-
tion of the word "commodities":
[Trhe word is ordinarily used in the commercial sense to desig-
nate any moveable or tangible thing that is produced or used as the sub-ject of barter. This is the definition of the word 'commodity' used in
the application of the Robinson-Patman Act.
PATMAN, supra note 17, at 33.
30. 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943).
31. THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST POLICY (The
Neal Report), BNA ANTITRUST TRADE REG. REP., May 27, 1969 (Special Sup-
plement), recommended that the Robinson-Patman Act be extended to cover
services [hereinafter cited as Neal Report].
32. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 295
F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 812 (1962).
33. See generally Cassady & Grether, The Proper Interpretation of "Like
Grade and Quality" Within the Meaning of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (1957); Rowe, Price Differentials and Product
Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 66 YALE L.J. 1
(1956).
34. Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., 71 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 590 (1934).
35. Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953). See REPORT, supra note
10, at 158; ROWE, 1962, supra note 16, at 63.
36. 383 U.S. 673 (1966).
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ference even though the products were identical in substance.
Borden was unsuccessful in its attempt to include customer pref-
erence in the "like grade and quality" requirement of the Robin-
son-Patman Act. Thus, after Borden, if the substance of the prod-
ucts is similar, the "like grade and quality" requirement will be
satisfied, and mere changes in patterns or design for consumer
preference will not suffice.
Sixth, there must be a price difference. The Supreme Court
in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. FTC87 defined price' discrimination
as a price differential in two sales of products of like grade and
quality. In the late 1950's Anheuser-Busch cut its price for beer
in the St. Louis market area while maintaining a higher price in
its other national markets. As a result of the lower price in St.
Louis, Anheuser-Busch's share of the St. Louis market rose from
12 to 39 per cent. The Supreme Court ruled that any price
difference constituted price discrimination if the other require-
ments of the Robinson-Patman Act were fulfilled.
In Anheuser-Busch, the Court noted that "price discrimina-
tion within the meaning of that provision [section 2(a)] is
merely a price difference."'18  If a price difference constitutes
price discrimination, then price uniformity results in no legal
price discrimination. This uniform price rule, as it has been
termed, exempts any seller from Robinson-Patman liability if
the seller charges every purchaser the same price. Decisions by
both the Federal Trade Commission89 and the courts40 prior
to the Anheuser-Busch decision suggest that a uniform price
would exempt a seller from legal liability under the Robinson-
Patman Act.41
Seventh, the price differential must produce a competitive
injury. The Robinson-Patman Act was originally designed to pre-
serve competition at the customer level. To accomplish this goal,
three separate levels of injury were originally included in the
Act. The relevant provision of section 2(a) states that,
37. 363 U.S. 536 (1960). See also Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil
Co., 187 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); REPORT, supra note 10, at 217 n.274;
ROWE, 1962, supra note 16, at 99.
38. 363 U.S. at 549.
39. Bird & Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548, 553 (1937).
40. FTC v. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 757 (1945) (suggestion that a
uniform price to all delivered points would not be illegal under the Robinson-
Patman Act); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 138 F. Supp. 560 (D. Del.), aff'd, 237 F.2d
13 (3d Cir. 1956).
41. See generally REPORT, supra note 10, at 217 n.274; RowE, 1962, supra
note 16, at 99; Comment, "The Tyranny of Labels"-A Study of Functional Dis-
counts Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 60 HARV. L. REv. 571 (1947) [herein-
after cited as Tyranny of Labels].
[Vol. 14
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where the effect of such discrimination may be substan-
tially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in
any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy or prevent com-
petition with any person who either grants or knowingly re-
ceives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers
of either of them .... 42
a violation of the Act will be found. There are, then, several
levels of injury: the primary injury occurs between the sup-
plier and his competitors; the secondary level injury occurs among
the buyers of the suppliers; and the tertiary level injury oc-
curs among the customers of the buyers from the supplier."
Before 1969, these three levels of injury were accepted by
most authorities.44  The notable exception was Frederick Rowe, "5
who stated in 1962 that "this esoteric doctrine [referring to ter-
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 13(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
43. A diagram will be helpful to explain the levels of injury concept.
Levels of
Injury
Manufacturer Competitors of
<- Ist--
Supplier Supplier
Wi <-2nd-> W2
31 E3 rd-- J2
R1 <-4th--> R2
Customers
Symbols: W =Wholesaler; J Jobber; R = Retailer.
Note: Wl, J1, RI are granted a discriminatory price as compared to W2,
J2, R2.
Supplier competes with other suppliers and sells to wholesalers.
The levels of injury are then: the first or primary injury occurring between the
supplier and his competitors; the second level or secondary injury occurring be-
tween the competing wholesalers (WI and W2); the third level or tertiary injury
occurring between the jobbers (J1 and J2); and finally, the fourth level injury oc-
curring between the retailers (RI and R2).
44. See, e.g., Dam, The Economics and Law of Price Discrimination: Herein
of Three Regulatory Schemes, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Dam]; PATMAN, supra note 17, at 65.
45. ROWE, 1962, supra note 16, at 200.
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tiary injury] appears of dubious validity today.' 46  In Perkins
v. Standard Oil, 7 the Supreme Court included "fourth level" in-
juries in the Robinson-Patman Act.48 In this case, Clyde Per-
kins, an independent wholesaler-retailer of gasoline, alleged that
Standard charged its own independent subsidiaries and another
independent wholesaler-retailer less than the price Perkins was
charged. As a result of this price discrimination, Perkins was
forced to sell his gas stations to a competitor of Standard at a
substantial loss. The district court held for Perkins, but the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court be-
cause the injury occurred at the "fourth level", and was there-
fore not prohibited by section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act. The controversy in Perkins over the levels of injury origi-
nated in the phrase "with customers of either of them." The Su-
preme Court reinstated the district court verdict for Perkins on
the grounds that section 2(a) covered a "fourth level" injury.
Based on Perkins, if the causal chain from price discrimination
to injury remains unbroken, then anyone injured in the chain of
distribution may recover from the firm responsible for the dis-
criminatory pricing regardless of the number of distribution links.
The competitive injury must be substantial.4 9 If there is a
discriminatory price granted to a purchaser of buttons which are
used in the manufacture of shirts, there will probably be no
competitive effect because the cost of buttons is only a small frac-
tion of the total cost of a shirt. An example of this theory oc-
curred in Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC,50 where
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that Honeywell's price discrimination had no substantial effect
on competition at the secondary level, because prices on Honey-
well's temperature controls constituted only a small part of the
46. Id. at 196.
47. 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
48. See note 43 supra.
49. Secatore's, Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp. 665 (D. Mass.
1959), held that a manufacturer was not obligated to sell to retail distributors
at lower prices than to direct-buying customers. The court reasoned that a dis-
tributor could not compete for sales to direct-buying customers by receiving an
equal price (uniform price rule), and consequently, could not be injured by a
discriminatory price favoring the direct buying customers! The Seventh Circuit
has also held that the two firms receiving discounts must be in competition with
each other. Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th
Cir. 1949).
50. 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). See
also American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 954 (1964), in which a reduction of prices during a 17-day gas war was
also held not to have a substantial effect on competition; FTC v. Uarco Co.,
[1963-65 CCH TRANSFER BINDER] TRADE REG. REP. 1 16,807 (FTC 1964), in
which an occasional off-list sale to six customers was held not to have a sub.
stantial effect on competition.
[V/ol. 14
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total cost of a furnace. On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit
also has held that if the price of corn starch used for the produc-
tion of candy varied even one percent, the anticompetitive ef-
fects were both real and significant."
Once an initial determination of substantial competitive in-
jury is made, a distinction can be drawn between first-line injury
and second, third and fourth-line injury. In the first-line in-
jury, there must be injury to competition, whereas in second,
third or fourth-line injury it must merely be shown that harm to
competitors has occurred.52 The first category of injury can be
seen in Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread." In Moore, the plaintiff
and defendant were the only two bakeries in a small New Mexico
town. The defendant subsidized his price cutting through other
interstate sales. Since the defendant's discriminatory acts harmed
his only competitor, the defendant's action necessarily must have
harmed competition, and constituted a violation of section 2(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act.
The second category of lower level injuries is exemplified
in FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,54 where harm to competitors rather
than 'to competition occurred. Morton Salt operated a dual dis-
tribution system which used yearly quantity discounts. The larger
discounts were available only to carload purchasers, and only
five chain stores qualified for the largest discount. Justice
Black reasoned that smaller grocery stores competing with the
five large chain stores were injured because small grocery stores
could not qualify for the larger discounts, implying that in this
second category, the plaintiff need only show harm to competi-
tors.
The Supreme Court, in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking
Co., 5 weakened the injury to competition requirement. In
Utah Pie, the plaintiff entered the Salt Lake City frozen pie busi-
ness by undercutting prevailing market prices by 15 to 20 percent.
As a result of this lower price, Utah Pie captured 67 percent of
the market. Three national suppliers responded by reducing
their prices in Salt Lake City by 10 to 15 percent below their
national prices. The Supreme Court labeled -the response of the
three national suppliers a "drastic" price cut, and allowed plaintiff
to recover against the three defendants although plaintiff's sales,
51. See generally FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952); FrC v. Corn
Products Refining Co., 34 F.T.C. 850 (1942), modified, 144 F.2d 211 (7th Cir.
1944), aff'd, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
52. See Blackford, Survey, supra note 21, at 298 n.19.
53. 348 U.S. 115 (1954). See also Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. FTC, 371
F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966).
54. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
55. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
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profits, and net worth had increased during the period of de-
fendants' discriminatory pricing, and plaintiff's prices were at all
times lower than defendants'. Based on Utah Pie, it appears that
the stringent definition of harm to competition has been lessened
by the Supreme Court to the point where any discriminatory
price will be held to injure competition in some manner thereby
fulfilling this element of section 2(a). The Neal Report,56 how-
ever, in its proposed revision to the Robinson-Patman Act would
specifically reverse the holding in Utah Pie.
Before price discrimination can occur under the Neal Re-
port's proposed modification of the Robinson-Patman Act, the
plaintiff must prove both that a significant disparity exists be-
tween the areas served by the discriminator and the smaller com-
petitor, and that the discriminator's lower price was less than rea-
sonably anticipated long-run average costs.
There are two elements of legal injury in a price discrimina-
tion case. First, all seven requirements of a prima facie case of
price discrimination under section 2(a) must be proved, and
second, the disfavored buyer must have suffered some economic
harm such as lower profits or reduced sales during the time of
the alleged price discrimination. Since the Utah Pie decision,
the extent of injury required to sustain an action may merely be
lower profits and sales than would have existed had there been
56. The relevant portion of the Neal Report's proposed change to the Rob-
inson-Patman Act is section 2(b):
A discrimination shall be held to have the effect described in sub-
section (a) (subsection (a) prohibits price discrimination) only where:
(iii) The person granting the discrimination is in compe-
tition with others serving significantly more limited areas (ter-
ritories or classes of customers which are relevant lines of
commerce), the discrimination is restricted to one or more
such limited areas (representing a small part of the total area
served by the person granting the discrimination), the consid-
eration exacted in such limited areas is less than the reason-
ably anticipated long-run average cost of serving those areas
(including capital costs), and the discrimination imminently
threatens to eliminate from such a limited area one or more
competitors whose survival is significant to the maintenance of
competition in that area.
Neal Report, supra note 31, at 18. The comment is as follows:
Subsection (b)(iii) deals with instances of "primary line" injury
in similarly stringent fashion. Where the claim is that the discrimina-
tion is adversely affecting a competitor of the discriminator, there is
the distinct possibility that the competitor is really seeking relief from
competition. Accordingly, it is desirable that the scope of liability be
narrowly circumscribed. This is accomplished by requiring that there
be a significant disparity between the areas served by the discriminator
and the smaller competitors; that the discrimination be limited to a
small part of the discriminator's area of operation; that the lower price
be less than reasonably anticipated long-run average costs; and that the
discrimination threaten the imminent adverse effects upon competition
described in connection with subsection (b)(iii). Among other things,
this revision would clearly reverse the result in Utah Pie Co. v. Contin-
ental Baking Co., 87 S. Ct. 1326 (1967) [386 U.S. 685].
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no discrimination. It is possible that the rationale of Utah Pie
will be limited, based on the Court's finding of clear predatory
intent and by the factual context of national firms competing
against one small local firm. The decision in Honeywell still
appears to be viable, 7 and thus the disfavored purchaser probably
must suffer at least something greater than the injury sustained
in Honeywell, where the price discrimination was found to con-
stitute only a small portion of the total cost of the product.
STATUTORY DEFENSES To FUNCTIONAL DISCOUNTS
The seller in a price discrimiiation action may rely on the
cost justification defense found in section 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act. The relevant provision states:
... PROVIDED, That nothing herein contained shall pre-
vent differentials which make only due allowance for dif-
ferences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery result-
ing from the differing methods or quantities in which such
commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered . . .5
In the study of cost justification, one should realize that as a firm
performs additional functions it also incurs additional costs.
Only after a careful examination of both the cost incurred and
the discount offered for the performance of these functions, can
one determine if a buyer or seller is discriminating in its pricing
policies.
The burden of proving a cost justification defense rests on
the seller charged with price discrimination,5" who may only in-
clude those cost savings which he achieves by having part of his
distribution function performed by other firms.60 Actual costs,
however, are easier to prove than hypothetical costs. Therefore,
this requirement adds an additional obstacle to the cost justifica-
tion defense because it is easier to prove an independent buyer's
actual cost than the estimated cost savings created internally by
57. See Continental Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co. & Interstate
Breads Corp., 1973-1 CCH TRADE CASES T 74,433 (10th Cir. 1973) (construction
of a plant which was operated at only 50% capacity and which only showed
a profit at the end of the damage period combined with an increase in prices
after a competitor went out of business was sufficient to show predatory intent);
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786,(7th Cir. 1951 ), peti-
tion for cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 13(a) (1970).
59. See Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAN. L.
REV. 3, 8 (1953); Murray, Cost Justification Under the Robinson-Patman Act:
Impossibility Revisited, 1960 Wis. L. REV. 227, 228 [hereinafter cited as
Murray, Cost Justification].
60. FTC v. Purolator Products, 65 F.T.C. 8 (1964); E. KINTNER, A ROBIN-
SON-PATMAN PRIMER 142 (1970) [hereinafter cited as KINTNER, PRIMER];
PATMAN, supra note 17, at 25.
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the seller having an independent buyer perform some of the sell-
er's duties. Nevertheless, the cost justification rule provides that
the seller is justified only in passing on cost savings that it saves
internally by having others perform some of its functions.
The economic premise of the cost justification defense is that a
seller should not be forced by law to charge an artificially high
price to a low-cost buyer if the seller can prove that the buyer is
actually a low-cost buyer.61 Therefore, the cost justification de-
fense should include all expenses incurred by a buyer or seller
in the performance of any functions pursuant to the particular
sale in issue. The factors to consider in determining just compen-
sation are the objective measurable costs in an accounting sense
coupled with the subjective measurable factors in an economic
sense. The first category includes all accounting costs incurred
by the buyer or seller. A fair rate of return on invested capital
should also be included in this category as well as a reasonable
economic profit for the entrepreneur.
Additionally, several subjective measurable factors still ex-
ist in economic theory. These factors are more difficult to meas-
ure in a legal and accounting sense, yet still constitute economic
costs. The first factor to consider is the desire for a supplier to
insure that his plant runs at capacity, and for the buyer to insure
that he has a steady supply of the particular commodity for large
orders. The economics of scale which may occur when a firm
either integrates downstream or upstream should also be in-
cluded in the cost justification defense. 62  A third factor to
be considered is that the entrepreneur must be given an appro-
priate return for assuming risks. The preceding factors are not
easily measured by accountants, thus creating a reluctance on
the part of courts to recognize or mention them, let alone include
them in a cost justification analysis. In pure economic theory,
each of the previously discussed factors should be considered by
the courts when applying the cost justification defense in func-
tional discount cases. Only by considering all of these factors
can one ascertain whether economic discrimination has in fact
occurred.
Examining the cost justification defense as a whole, it ap-
pears that the present judicial and administrative interpretation
deserves both praise and criticism. 63 The defense often fails in
court because it is used as an excuse after a supplier is caught
selling at a discriminatory price.64 The Federal Trade Commis-
61. KINTNER, PRIMER, supra note 60, at 25.
62. See note 89 and accompanying text infra.
63. Murray, Cost Justification, supra note 59, at 233.
64. Although not impossible, it is extremely difficult to recreate the proper
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sion in its administrative enforcement of the Robinson-Patman
Act seldom accepts the cost justification defense. 5 The Report
of the Attorney General's Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
suggested that the phrase "due allowance" found in section 2(a)
be broadened to insure that the most honest estimates used by
businessmen in functional discounts be accepted. 6  This sug-
gested change has not been followed by either the Federal Trade
Commission or the courts. Another suggestion is to lessen the
procedural burden of proof required of a seller attempting to use
the cost justification defense. The Neal Report recommended a
revised cost justification defense which would have accepted rea-
sonable estimates on cost savings as part of the cost justification
defense. 67
NON-STATUTORY DEFENSES TO FUNCTIONAL DISCOUNTS
In addition to a cost justification defense the seller has sev-
eral non-statutory defenses to functional discounts. Under these
non-statutory defenses, a seller charged with price discrimination
may defend his actions by showing a lack of one of the seven ele-
ments required to prove legal price discrimination. The most com-
distribution setting based on the previously collected non-distribution accounting
data in order that the the distribution costs be properly determined.
65. A statistical compilation of the cost justification defenses used in recent
cases may be found in Rowe, The Federal Trade Commission's Administration
of the Antitrust Discrimination Law-A Paradox of Antitrust Policy, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 426 (1964).
66. REPORT, supra note 10, at 174.
67. The Neal Report, supra note 31, at 20, proposed the following cost
justification statute:
(d) It shall be a defense to a charge of discrimination that the
lesser exaction of consideration makes an appropriate allowance for
differences in the cost of manufacture, distribution, sale, or delivery re-
suiting from the differing methods or quantities involved in the transac-
tions in question. An allowance is appropriate where the difference in
consideration does not substantially exceed the difference in cost; where
the difference in consideration does not exceed a reasonable estimate of
the difference in cost; or where the difference in consideration is the
result of a reasonable system of classifying transactions which is based
on characteristics affecting cost of manufacture, distribution, sale or de-
livery, under which differences in consideration between classes approx-
imate differences in cost. If a system of classification is held to be un-
lawful, the court or agency so ruling should indicate either (i) that the
seller's customers are so similar in pertinent characteristics that no sys-
tem of classification would be valid or (ii) that a system of classifica-
tion described by the court or agency may properly be employed in
lieu of the one held to be unlawful.
THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COM-
PETITION (The Stigler Report), BNA ANTrUST TRADE REG. REP. No. 413
(1969), agreed with the Neal Report in substance, but the Stigler Report did
not criticize the present Robinson-Patman Act as openly. After a 15-month sur-
vey, a Special Subcommittee of the House Small Business Committee concluded
that the criticism of the Robinson-Patman Act in the Neal and Stigler Reports
was unwarranted. H.R. REP. No. 91-1617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969).
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mon element alleged to be missing is an effect on competition.
There are several possible defenses to avoid the effect on compe-
tition requirement: (1) the buyers are in distinct markets which
do not overlap; (2) there is no substantial effect on competition
from the price discrimination; (3) the buyer could have pur-
chased the product at the alleged discriminatory price from the
defendant firm or competing firms (the availability defense); or(4) there has been a break in the causal chain between the al-
leged discrimination and the possible adverse competitive effect.
The first defense is simply that the two purchasers are not
competitors because they are in distinct markets, and conse-
quently, the favored buyer does not receive an unfair competi-
tive advantage over the non-favored buyer.6 8 There is no effect
on competition, and therefore, no possible injury to competition.
A second possible defense is to state that the effect on competition
is negligible. The Honeywell Regulator69 case is an example of
this situation. As Honeywell's price discrimination on furnace
controls constituted only a small part of the total cost of a fur-
nace, it did not substantially affect competition and therefore was
not subject to section 2(a) censure.
The availability defense requires that the injured plaintiff
have had the opportunity to purchase the product at the allegedly
discriminatory price, but chose not to exercise the option."0 The
reasons a buyer might not purchase at an allegedly lower discrim-
inatory price might include the fact that he did not want to buy
in large volumes which were available to all purchasers on equal
terms, or that he might not have known of other available sources
from competing sellers. Although the principal issue in Perkins
v. Standard Oil7 was the extension of recoverable injury from
the third to the fourth level, Perkins also considered the availa-
bility defense. This defense arose in the context of non-price
discrimination between branded dealers and private label custo-
mers such as Perkins.7" During price wars, Standard Oil sub-
sidized its branded dealers but failed to give comparable assist-
ance to its private label customers. The branded dealers were
also given credit card privileges, painting, advertising, and main-
tenance allowances. The Ninth Circuit held that Standard was
68. See National Nut Co. of Calif. v. Kelling Nut Co., 61 F. Supp. 76 (N.D.
Il1. 1945).
69. 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), petition for cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206
(1952).
70. The Neal Report, supra note 31, at 18, would codify the availability de-
fense in its proposed revision to the Robinson-Patman Act.
71. 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
72. See Von Kalinowski, Availability as a Defense to Private Label Mar-
keting, 39,A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST 841 (1970).
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required to grant these same allowances to Perkins, and that
Standard's failure to do so violated section 2(a). The Supreme
Court concurred on this issue noting that "the Court of Appeals
found that Standard's liability for the harm done Perkins by the
favorable treatment of the branded dealer was beyond dispute.
78
Perkins, therefore, implicitly discussed the problem of avail-
ability, and it appears that if price concessions and other non-
price allowances are available to all customers who qualify, then
the causal chain from price discrimination to competitive injury
will be broken. 74  Availability from a separate source should also
break the causal chain between price discrimination and competi-
tive injury. 78 The Attorney General's Report stated that a com-
petitive price reduction should not be "singled out as respon-
sible for 'injury' if alternative means of access to goods at the
lower price are in any event available to the buyer."71 6  Thus, a
seller should not be held to have violated section 2(a) if the seller
insures that all price and non-price allowances are functionally
available to all customers who qualify.
77
A break in the causal chain is the fourth method of avoid-
ing the element of an affect on competition. In Thomas E.
Belliston v. Texaco, Inc.,78 a recent case dealing with the break
of the causal link, Texaco granted Flinco two price discounts:
one-half cent per gallon for picking up the gasoline from an
American refinery and four cents per gallon for maintaining and
providing services for some of its retail stations. Although all
branded dealers had the same retail pump price, the alleged price
difference came from the bonus plans offered at the Flinco-Texaco
branded stations. The plan provided customers a saving of ap-
proximately 20 per gallon when buying from Flinco. Belliston
alleged that it was injured by the bonus program offered by
Flinco's stations because the program originated from Texaco's
four and one-half cent price discount granted to Flinco.
73. 395 U.S. at 645.
74. FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968) (supplier granting adver-
tising allowances is required to make them available on equally proportional
terms to all competing purchasers).
75. RowE, 1962, supra note 16, at 193.
76. REPORT, supra note 10, at 164-65.
77. See Aubrey D. Hanson v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Indus., Inc., 1973-1
CCH TRADE CASES 74,564 (5th Cir. 1973) (availability defense was applicable);
Continental Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 1973-1 CCH TRADE CASES
% 74,433 (10th Cir. 1973) (availability defense inapplicable); Mueller Co. v. FTC,
323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1963). The availability defense found in section 2(d) may
be applicable to section 2(a) if the terms of the discount were truly available to
all prospective purchasers. Contra, Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1249
(9th Cir. 1969). See generally Millstein, The Status of "Availability" Under
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 416 (1967).
78. 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972).
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
Texaco argued that this price concession was used up by
Flinco in performing services, and thus the causal chain from dis-
criminatory price concession to competitive harm was broken.79
This break was allegedly caused because the value of the discount
was consumed by the customer receiving the discount in the per-
formance of the "functions." The trial judge rejected Texaco's
theory of a break in the causal chain and sent the Robinson-Pat-
man Act claim to the jury. The jury awarded Belliston three
hundred thousand dollars, which the court then trebled. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however,
reversed on interstate commerce grounds, stating that all of the
sales had occurred in Utah even though Texaco pumped the
crude gasoline from Colorado into Utah before refining. In
response to Belliston's petition for certiorari, Texaco's brief in op-
position asserted,
There was no evidence that any such differences in net
price produced any injury to competition but, on the con-
trary, evidence that the distributor discount was exhausted
by wholesaling expenses and a reasonable return on invest-
ment .... 80
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, precluding
Texaco from asserting a break in the causal chain argument as a
defense to its use of functional discounts.8' Although rejected
by the Tenth Circuit, this argument still may be viable and
accepted by other circuits.
ECONOMIC PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND INJURY
The factors involved in the economic definitions of price dis-
crimination and economic injury vary considerably from their legal
79. See generally Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968), in
which the plaintiff failed to prove that his injuries were directly attributable to
defendant's discriminatory pricing policy rather than to consumer preferences
and technological changes; Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967),
in which there was no proof that a private label price differential caused the
competitor any injuries; American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964), in which price reductions during a 17-day
gas war were attributable to price reductions already in effect by other major
oil companies; Anheuser-Busch v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961), in which
one competitor experienced quality problems and a change of ownership, while
another competitor actually increased sales by 14 percent; Alexander v. Texas
Co., 165 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. La. 1958), in which the injury was caused by plain-
tiff's own high price policy.
80. Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 9, Belliston v. Texaco,
Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972). Flinco
provided the following services to its stations: (1) maintenance for all of its sta-
tions; (2) hired salesmen to take orders from its dealers for products offered; (3)
supplied technical advice whenever needed; (4) provided money to pay for needed
technical improvements, and (5) provided an accounting service to its dealers.
81. Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 928 (1972).
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counterparts. It is therefore necessary to study the economic def-
inition of price discrimination and economic injury to understand
fully the impact of functional discounts on the marketplace.
The concept of marginal cost is essential to an understanding of
economic price discrimination. In economic terms, marginal
cost is simply the added cost expended by a firm to produce one
additional unit of the product in question.
Economic price discrimination occurs when the ratio of
price to marginal cost is unequal as a result of the sales of two or
more similar goods."2 More specifically, economic price discrimi-
nation has occurred when the price of the first good sold (P1)
divided by its marginal cost (MC1) does not equal the price of
the second good sold (P2) divided by the second good's marginal
cost (MC2). Stated in a formula, if after the sale of two identi-
cal products, P1/MC1 * P2/MC2, economic discrimination has
occurred.
An example of price discrimination is the price differential
between hardbound books selling for $6 and paperback books
selling for $2. The binding presumably does not make up the
difference, and so those paying for the hardbound book are pay-
ing a discriminatory price. Price differences, however, do not
necessarily mean price discrimination. Thus, a wholesaler is
charged less on an item per item basis than a retailer because
the wholesaler buys in greater quantities. On the other hand,
price equality may also be price discrimination. In the case of
college classes, students in a large beginning class taught by an
instructor pay the same tuition as students enrolled in a small
class taught by a full professor. The students in the small
class taught by the professor obviously cost the college more
than those students taking the introductory course taught by
the instructor.
Four economic conditions must exist for a seller to success-
fully price discriminate."' First, there must be two or more iden-
tifiable classes of buyers. Second, these classes of buyers must
be capable of being separated into distinct markets at a reason-
able cost. Third, the buyers' elasticities of demand must be ap-
preciably different. Fourth, there cannot be any close substitute
products. When these necessary conditions are present, a seller
may follow an economically discriminatory pricing policy such
that P1/MC1 * P2/MC2. The result of the discriminatory
pricing policy is a misallocation of goods among buyers due to
82. G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 209 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited
as STIGLER, THEORY OF PRICE].
83. Id. at 210.
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the inequality between the price/marginal cost ratiosA4
From an economic perspective, it is the inequality of ratios that
is necessary for economic injury to exist. In a theoretical
sense, the method of determining the degree of discrimination
is first to find the price level as if no discrimination existed. Then,
assuming that the marginal costs are the same in both the discrim-
inating situation and the non-discriminating situation, one must
compare the differences in ratios to determine the extent of in.
jury.
The determination of economic price discrimination is further
confused by readjustments which an injured buyer makes in the
market. If the economic discrimination is permitted to continue,
the injured buyer can respond in several ways. First, the buyer
might seek out alternative sources of supply. Assuming that this
option is unavailable, the injured buyer might attempt to integrate
vertically, eliminate the seller and thereby avoid the effects of
the seller's discriminatory pricing policy. Another alternative
which could be utilized by the injured buyer would be to pass
along the discriminatory price which he received to his buyers.
This option, however, is available only if the injured buyer has
some market power (the ability to manipulate price and quantity
sold) in the resale of his products. Finally, the buyer might be
so injured that he will be unable to survive in the market, and
thus go out of business.
Once the determination of economic injury is made, a prob-
lem exists in tracing this injury from its appearance in the form
of a price differential (out of proportion to the different mar-
ginal costs) back to its source. For example, a supplier may
discriminate in the price he charges a wholesaler, but the discrim-
ination may be passed on and only belatedly surface at the retail
level in the form of a price differential between competing re-
tailers. A mere price differential at any level of the distribution
chain, however, is not necessarily the result of an economic in-jury, but rather may be caused by economies of scale which
one firm has attained through increased production or through
more efficient operation.
FUNCTIONAL DIsCOUNTS AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Many of the pressures behind a firm's desire to integrate
84. There is no simple rule concerning the effect of discrimination on out-
put. See J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 188-95(1933). There is one situation in which some discrimination may be necessary
to insure the production of goods. An example is the railroad industry where
price discrimination between different classes of buyers is used to keep total rev-
enue greater than total cost. STIGLER, THEORY OF PRICE, supra note 82, at 210.
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vertically are the same for a firm contemplating the performance
of additional functions. Accordingly, the study of vertical integra-
tion is helpful in providing fuller understanding of functional
discounts and their relationship to "buying distribution." Verti-
cal integration occurs when a firm performs all of the functions
at the next higher or lower stage in the distribution chain. One
approach to the study of vertical integration was developed by
Professor Coase. 5 In his article, he explored the possible ra-
tionales for the vertical integration of a firm. Integration is de-
fined as the "organization of transactions which previously had
been carried on by the market." 6  The major premise of the
article is that a firm will vertically integrate as long as the in-
ternal costs of integrating are less than the market costs. That
is, the firm will internalize the transaction if the internal cost is
less than the external or market cost for a given transaction.87
There are, however, limits to the size of the firm based on a
decreasing return to the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur ulti-
mately reaches the point where it is cheaper to use the market
than to keep the transaction within the firm. The firm is also
limited by the fact that it may be unable to integrate one step at
a time. The market may be so structured as to force the firm
to jump several steps to effectively integrate. If the entrepreneur
has already reached the limit of his skill, this final jump may
be too much. In this situation the firm will be precluded
from integrating the one step it could viably undertake due to the
necessity of jumping several steps.88
There are two types of vertical integration: upstream and
downstream. 9 In upstream vertical integration, a firm internalizes
a transaction of inputs which had previously been conducted in
the market. An example of upstream integration would be a job-
ber performing all of the wholesale functions. In the case of
downstream vertical integration, a firm internalizes a transaction
of outputs which had previously been conducted in the market.
An example of downstream integration would be a jobber selling
85. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMicA 387 (1937) [hereinafter
cited as Coase].
86. Id. at 398.
87. The costs of using the market are as follows: (1) the cost to obtain
price information for the particular transaction; (2) the cost to hire specialists
to interpret this market information; (3) the cost to negotiate the prices vis-
a-vis contracts with the parties in the market; (4) the cost of uncertainty of
both price and quantity unless long term contracts are used; (5) the tax on each
transaction consummated in the market. Id. at 390.
88. Professor Coase observed that vertical integration necessarily "varies
greatly from industry to industry and from firm to firm." Id.
89. See generally SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1971).
1974]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
at retail level. In either upstream or downstream integration, a
firm will internalize the transaction if the internal price is less
than the market price. Vertical integration, therefore, is actually
the total performance of all functions at the next level of distri-
bution. The economic forces behind a firm's desire to vertically
integrate or simply perform a few additional functions either up-
stream or downstream are basically the same.
'ANALYSIS OF FUNCTIONAL DISCOUNTS
This article is based on the premise that detrimental effects
on competition are engendered by the discrepancies between the
economic and legal definitions of injury caused by functional dis-
counts. In economic terms, injury occurs when two buyers pur-
chase goods such that P1/MC1 * P2/MC2. On the other hand,
legal injury only occurs when the following seven elements exist:
(1) a seller makes two sales; (2) in interstate commerce; (3)
to two or more different purchasers; (4) of commodities; (5)
of like grade and quality; (6) at a price difference; (7) which
produces a competitive injury.0° With two different definitions,
in some instances economic injury will result while legal injury
does not occur, and in other cases there will be legal injury al-
though there is no economic injury. The two definitions seldom
agree.9'
Four areas in present case law highlight the differences be-
tween the legal and economic definitions of injury. These four
areas include: (1) the cost justification defense which does not
allow a fair rate of return on invested distribution capital to be in-
cluded in the statutory defense; (2) the indirect purchaser doc-
trine which allows the Federal Trade Commission to ignore an
independent segment of the distribution chain, whereby all func-
tions performed by an independent firm within the distribution
chain are denied compensation; (3) the price-by-use doctrine
which does not recognize the performance of valid functions by an
integrated firm in the distribution chain; and, (4) the uniform
price rule which allows a dual distributor to economically discrim-
inate by ignoring the performance of functions by firms within
the distribution chain, while at the same time not legally discrimi-
nating. Each of these areas will be briefly examined to deter-
mine the adverse effects on competition engendered by the dis-
crepancies between the economic and legal definitions of injury
caused by functional discounts.
90. See generally Blackford, Survey, supra note 21, at 287.
91. M. MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 172 (1962).
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Cost Justification
The cost justification defense was incorrectly applied in FTC
v. Thompson Products92 when the Commission charged Thomp-
son with a section 2(a) violation based on Thompson's lower
prices to Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors as compared to
auto part warehousers. Thompson defended the lower prices
utilizing the cost justification defense. As part of this defense,
Thompson stated that it had invested 8.6 million dollars in dis-
tribution capital in selling its products to normal auto part ware-
housers, but required no distribution capital in selling to Ford,
Chrysler, and General Motors because of their willingness to re-
ceive shipments directly off the production line without warehous-
ing. The Commission, however, refused to include this cost of
capital in Thompson's cost justification defense, and ordered
Thompson to stop charging the three automobile manufacturers
lower prices than it charged auto part warehousers. In light of
this decision, an integrated wholesaler-retailer cannot expect any
price concessions from suppliers based or cost savings in the
form of a reduction or an elimination of distribution capital in
selling to the integrated retailer-wholesaler. At present, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission does not allow a fair rate of return to be
included in the cost analysis of an integrated buyer." The
economic effect of the denial of a fair rate of return on invested
distribution capital results in a reluctance by firms in the distribu-
tion chain to experiment with new methods of distribution which
require the expenditure of capital for distribution facilities. This
unwillingness to experiment tends to stifle competition within the
distribution markets.
Indirect Purchaser Doctrine
The indirect purchaser doctrine means that if the supplier
controls the resale of its products by a wholesaler or jobber, then
the supplier is liable for any price differences which appear be-
92. 55 F.T.C. 1252, 1276 (1959). See H. TAGGART, COST JUSTIFICATION 565
(1959); S. Nelson, An Economic Analysis of Antitrust Policy in the Automo-
tive Industry, (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970) in Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2497, 2620 (Part 5 Appendix) (1970) [herein-
after cited as Nelson, Economic Analysis].
93. Thompson Products has been followed in later FTC decisions. See FTC
v. Borden Co., 62 F.T.C. 130, 180 (1963); FTC v. Sperry Rand Corp., [1961-63
CCH TRANSFER BINDER] TRADE REG. REP. 16,350 (FTC 1963); FTC v.
Forster Mfg. Co., [1961-63 CCH TRANSFER BINDER] TRADE REG. REP.
15,729 (FTC 1962). See also Comment, Price Discrimination-Functional Dis-
counts: "Equal Opportunity to All?," 9 UTAH L. REv. 626 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Price Discrimination].
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tween sales to this indirect purchaser and sales to other pur-
chasers. The indirect purchaser doctrine is normally applied when
a jobber buying from a wholesaler has its price controlled by the
supplier, which results in the jobber being considered the indirect
purchaser of the supplier. The doctrine has been used to broaden
the scope of the meaning of purchaser and purchaser liability un-
der the Robinson-Patman Act. 4
The indirect purchaser doctrine originated in Matter of
Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp.9  Kraft-Phenix solicited orders
from retailers, issued suggested price lists which wholesalers us-
ually followed and directly exchanged fresh cheese for the re-
tailer's stale cheese. Based on these findings, the Commission
stated: "A retailer is nonetheless a purchaser because he buys in-
directly if, as here, the manufacturer deals with him directly in
promoting the sale of his products and exercises control over the
terms on which he buys."9  The degree of control required be-
fore the indirect purchaser doctrine can be applied is a question
of fact and, consequently, the determination must be made on a
case by case basis. The supplier's control over price has emerged
as the significant legal factor in this determination. 7 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, has
limited the scope of the doctrine by refusing to apply the indirect
purchaser doctrine to private suits.98 Although the Justice De-
partment and the Federal Trade Commission may continue to use
it, private litigants are precluded from relying upon this doctrine.
The necessity and present vitality of the indirect purchaser
doctrine is suspect in view of the Perkins9 case. Notwithstand-
ing the sufficient overlap of control between the favored whole-
saler, jobber, and retailer to warrant application of the indirect
purchaser doctrine, the Supreme Court ignored the doctrine en-
tirely, and instead applied a result-oriented test by looking at
Perkins' injury and placing the legal liability on Standard. After
Perkins the indirect purchaser doctrine's utility is dubious, at
best. The lower courts, however, continue to apply the doctrine
94. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 13(a), (c), (f) (1970).
95. 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937).
96. Id. at 546.
97. See Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969); Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical,
Inc., 407 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1970); Dean Milk
Co. v. IFTC, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968); Schwartz v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 203
F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Mich. 1962); Massachusetts Brewers Ass'n v. Ballantine &
Sons Co., 129 F. Supp. 736 (D. Mass. 1955). See also F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIM-
INATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 8 (Supp. 1964) for a compilation
of Commission decisions focussing on the degree of control over price.
98. Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1956).
99. 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
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where the supplier retains sufficient control over price in the re-
sale of his product by the wholesaler or jobber.'00
One of the most controversial applications of the indirect
purchaser doctrine has arisen in the automotive replacement parts
industry, where the indirect purchaser doctrine has been applied
to buying groups, resulting in the finding of violations of the Act
by both suppliers and purchasers. Cooperative buying groups
have been called the "third force" in today's modern economy be-
cause they enable small jobbers or retailers to combine and achieve
the same economies as large, integrated wholesaler-jobber-retail-
ers who are bargaining with the large suppliers.1° 1 A buying
group or cooperative is an organization of buyers who pool their
orders to obtain better prices than would be available to them
individually.' The functions which a buying group performs at
the next level of distribution can encompass all or none of the
functions at that level.
A group of retailers constituting a buying group may simply
combine their purchases and attempt to buy directly from a sup-
plier, performing the same functions as those done by an inte-
grated wholesaler-jobber-retailer. Alternatively, these same retail-
ers may choose to combine orders and operate a warehouse for
storing carload shipments, thereby performing many or all of the
functions of a jobber and wholesaler. Although section 4 of the
Robinson-Patman Act exempts buying groups and cooperatives
from various legal penalties, this exemption does not include
violations of section 2.103
From an economic perspective, the price concession granted
to a buying group should be based on the functions which
the group performs. If a group of retailers merely combine their
orders, then any price concession granted by a jobber (or supplier
attempting to sell directly to them) should only compensate the re-
100. Although the Supreme Court did not deal with the indirect purchaser doc-
trine in F.T.C. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968), the Fred Meyer deci-
sion can be interpreted as eliminating the direct dealing and control requirements
of the indirect purchaser doctrine with respect to disfavored customers, if the
defendant has engaged in direct sales to the favored purchaser. See Checkers
Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 999 (1969).
101. Address by Commissioner Philip Elman, The Annual Convention of the
Cooperative Food Distributors of America, Miami Beach, Fla., May 2, 1966, in
Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-
Patman Act, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 1324 (1970).
102. Palmer, Buying Groups Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 42 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 143 (1965).
103. See, e.g., Mid-South Distribs. v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1961);
Kentucky Rural Elec. Cooperative Corp. v. Moloney Elec. Co., 282 F.2d 481
(6th Cir. 1960); American Motors Specialities Co. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.
1960); Southern California Jobbers, Inc., 1965 CCH TRADE Rro. REP. % 17,410.
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tailers for the performance of this function. If, on the other
hand, the retailers combine and perform all of the functions tra-
ditionally performed by a jobber, the group should receive the
jobber price instead of the retail price.
The Federal Trade Commission's reaction to buying groups
and their efforts to receive price concessions has varied between
extremes. 10 4  In recent years, the Federal Trade Commission has
applied the indirect purchaser doctrine based on a result-oriented
test rather than on one of reasoned economic analysis. Simply
stated, the Federal Trade Commission test looks at any price dif-
ferential between competing group members and non-members,
and incorrectly concludes that the members of a buying group
are being favored over the non-members if the group price is
lower.' 05 The courts generally have followed reasoning similar
to that of the Federal Trade Commission. Recently, however,
the Ninth Circuit has begun to examine the functions performed
by the buying group, rather than summarily affirming the Federal
Trade Commission orders. In Alhambra Motor Parts v. FTC,10 6
there were major differences in the methods by which manufac-
turers sold to defendant jobber-members as compared to inde-
pendent jobbers, and thus the court held that the burden was
on the Federal Trade Commission to show that the cost savings
to manufacturers from selling to defendant were not commensu-
rate with the price differential between the price received by de-
fendant and the independent jobbers.
Purolator Products, Inc. v. FTC °7 is a recent case which
highlights the Federal Trade Commission's position on buy-
ing groups and the indirect purchaser doctrine. Purolator dealt
with "internal distribution discounts" granted by Purolator to
affiliated jobber-wholesalers. In making its price comparison, the
Federal Trade Commission applied both the indirect purchaser
doctrine and the single entity theory. The single entity theory re-
gards the buying group and its individual members as one legal
entity. Purolator manufactured automotive replacement filters
104. Standard Motors Prods., Inc., 54 F.T.C. 814 (1957), af 'd, 265 F.2d
674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959) (Commission issued a complaint
against a supplier for granting a group a wholesale price); Mennen Co., 4 F.T.C.
258 (1922), rev'd, 288 F. 774 (2d Cir. 1923) (Commission issued a complaint
against supplier for refusing to grant a group a wholesale price).
105. See Panel Discussion--Some Special Problems Under the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, 30 A.B.A. SEc. ANTITRUST 72 (1966), where Francis C. Mayer, Chief
of the F.T.C. Division of Discriminatory Practices, stated:
• . . the critical point in these co-op wholesaler cases is the affiliation
between the wholesaler and the retailer. If the lower price granted to
the wholesaler can be traced to the retailer, then I don't think we have
any problems.
106. 309 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1962).
107. 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968).
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and sold them on a nationwide basis to both independent ware-
housers and jobber buying groups.10 8
The right side (W3-J3) of the diagram in the footnote rep-
resents the jobber buying group acting as a wholesaler. 109 The
Federal Trade Commission reasoned that jobbers received all of
the benefit of Purolator's additional four percent "internal re-
distribution" discount, and consequently, the price P13 would be
used as Purolator's price to the jobber buying group. Obviously,
this four percent discount represented what Purolator considered
a fair value for the performance of wholesale functions by the job-
ber buying group. The Commission, however, in using P13 as a
standard of comparison, disregarded any functions performed
by the jobber group at the wholesale level (W3) and any
economies of vertical integration achieved by the buying group.
The wholesaler's function of seeking out customers was elim-
inated by the buying groups as was the jobber's function of
seeking out sources of supply. Consequently, the jobber buying
group should have been encouraged to exploit this economy of
vertical integration by receiving a lower price from the supplier.
The supplier, however, could not include any expenses incurred
by the buying group in his cost justification defense because
the defense only includes seller cost savings.
The left side of the diagram represents a traditional inde-
pendent wholesaler (W1) and jobber (JI). Purolator approved
all jobbers to whom the wholesaler sold, imposed exclusive dealing
or requirement contracts on the wholesalers, controlled jobber in-
ventories, and effectively controlled the prices charged by Wl to
108. A complete treatment of the auto replacement parts market may be
found in DAVISSON, supra note 5.
109. Relevant portions of Purolator Products, Inc., Distribution System.
Purolator Products Inc.
4% "internal
P11 P13 < . distributiondiscount"
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J1 through suggested resale price lists. Based on its own policy,
Purolator stipulated before the trial examiner that it reserved to
itself the legal right to control sales to jobbers. The elements of
the indirect purchaser doctrine being present, the Commission ap-
plied the doctrine and attributed the price P21 back to Purolator.
By attributing P21 back to Purolator, the Commission necessarily
ignored all of the functions performed by Wl, such as providing
investment in distribution capital, and consequently these functions
were denied compensation.
After applying the indirect purchaser doctrine and the single
entity theory by attributing the buying group price (P13) to the
individual member jobbers (13), the Commission reasoned that
J1 and J3 competed with each other, and consequently, price
P21 should be compared to P13. P21 represented a jobber price
which economically should be higher than P11 due to W1 per-
forming functions at the wholesale level. Assuming that the
marginal costs of selling to W1 and W3 were the same, prices
P11 and P13 should have been equal. The effect of the Com-
mission's action was to compare prices at two different levels be-
tween two different channels of distribution without taking into
account either the different functions performed at each level or
the economies of vertical integration achieved by the two chan-
nels of distribution.
The Commission's Purolator decision was affirmed by the
Seventh Circuit, which, for the first time, passed on the legality
of the indirect purchaser doctrine in group buying cases. The
court stated that the doctrine "appears to have a reasonable ap-
plication to the facts of this case and a rational basis in law." 110
As support for applying the doctrine, the court further remarked
that if "the seller controls the sale, he is responsible for the dis-
crimination in the sale price, if there is such discrimination."' '11
This blind application of the doctrine is economically incorrect.
The proper question in determining price discrimination is not
the degree of control over the resale of products, but rather what
-functions are performed by the various entities at each level and in
each channel of distribution. Only after these questions are
answered can the proper prices be correctly compared to deter-
mine the extent of any price discrimination caused by the
supplier in its pricing scheme.
Purolator appealed the Seventh Circuit decision to the Su-
preme Court, charging that the indirect purchaser doctrine had
110. 352 F.2d at 884.
111. Id. at 883.
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no legislative foundation." 2  This ground of attack was tech-
nically correct; there is no explicit basis in the legislative history
of the Robinson-Patman Act for the indirect purchaser doctrine.
Once the doctrine was applied, however, it was evident that Puro-
lator exercised sufficient control over the resale of its products
by W1 and J1.
The Justice Department filed an amicus curiae brief in op-
position to the position taken by the Federal Trade Commission.
Commenting on buying groups in general, the brief stated that
"where such integration produces significant economies, it should
spur competition by forcing the competitors of the integrated en-
tity to look for more efficient methods of distribution."11  The
Department further stated that the present application of the in-
direct purchaser doctrine ignored the valid functions performed
by W1 and allowed the J1 jobbers to compete unfairly with
the J3 jobbers. The Department further noted that the doctrine
"should only be used to compare prices paid by purchasers at
the same level of distribution who presumably perform the same
functions,""' 4 indicating that only the same level of distribution
should be compared, and that within identical levels, the differ-
ing methods of distribution found in each channel of distribu-
tion should be considered before any valid price comparisons could
be made. Based upon the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari
in the Purolator case, the Federal Trade Commission's position
on the indirect purchaser doctrine is still viable."'
Price by Use Rule
The price by use rule requires that the buyer's use of the
product in reselling, rather than his buying capacity, determines
the price which he legally should be charged for the product."'
Applying the rule to a specific situation, when a jobber inte-
grates upstream and assumes all of the duties of the wholesaler
(the next higher level of distribution), the price charged this job-
ber must legally be determined by the jobber's use of the product.
Thus the jobber-wholesaler must legally receive the jobber price
112. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 17-19, Purolator Products, Inc. v.
FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968).
113. Brief for Justice Department as Amicus Curiae at 21, Purolator Products,
Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968).
114. Id. at 23.
115. See generally Nelson, Economic Analysis, supra note 92. For a recent
case applying the indirect purchaser doctrine see Southern Gen. Builders, Inc.
v. Maule Indus., Inc., 1973-1 CCH TRADE CASES % 74,484 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24,
1972).
116. General Foods, Inc., 52 F.T.C. 798, 824 (1956). See generally RowE,
1962, supra note 16, at 99; Comment, Price Discrimination, supra note 93.
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even though the jobber-wholesaler is buying at the wholesale level
and has performed all of the wholesale functions.
The price by use rule originated in Mennen Co. v. FTC,"7 a
1923 case in which the court stated that "(i)t is not the character
of his buying (the purchaser), but the character of his selling,
which marks him as a wholesaler.""'  Thus, the purchaser's use
of the product in resale, not his buying capacity, determined the
price which he had to pay. In a more recent Federal Trade Com-
mission decision, it appeared that the principle of functional dis-
counts would be accepted in place of the price by use rule."19
In 1962, however, the Federal Trade Commission returned to its
previous position of applying the price by use rule,120 which sub-
sequently has been followed in numerous Commission deci-
sions. "'2 1
Where the situation involves an integrated wholesaler-job-
ber-retailer, the price by use rule dictates that the integrated whole-
saler-jobber-retailer be charged the retail price rather than a
wholesale price. 2 2  The economic effect of this legal rule is that
an integrated wholesaler-jobber-retailer performs all of the whole-
sale and jobber functions without compensation. Using the Coase
analysis, the price by use rule makes the internal cost of per-
forming the functions at the wholesale and jobber level higher
than the market cost of buying the services in the market. The
law therefore acts as a positive disincentive against seeking econ-
omies of vertical integration. 1 3  Given the need for experimen-
tation in new distribution patterns, the price by use rule hinders
integrated wholesaler-jobber-retailers who are attempting to ex-
periment by further vertical integration.
The price by use rule has also been applied against dual dis-
tributors, firms which sell at two different distribution levels.
117. 288 F. 774 (2d Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 759 (1923).
118. Id. at 782.
119. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 52 F.T.C. 169 (1955) (section 2(a) is not
violated by defendant's granting a wholsesaler discount on all purchases by an inte-
grated wholesaler-retailer who actually performed the wholesale functions on all
purchases. The nature of the purchaser's buying rather than the nature of his
reselling was considered in granting functional discounts).
120. FTC v. Mueller Co., 60 F.T.C. 120 (1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964) (in his dissent, Judge Swygert clearly
explains both the price by use rule and the functional discount).
121. See, e.g., David Mann et al. Trading as Name Brand Distribs., 65
F.T.C. 497, 503 (1964); General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798, 810 (1956); Stan-
dard Oil Co. (Ind.), 43 F.T.C. 56 (1946) (the dissent by Commissioner Mason
lampooned the Commission's application of the price by use rule); Hansen Inocu-
lator Co., Inc., 26 F.T.C. 303 (1938).
122. See Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 928 (1972).
123. A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS 9 (1970).
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For example, a wholesaler may purchase all of its products from
suppliers, but resell its products both to jobbers and directly to
retailers (one step down the distribution ladder) thus competing
with its own jobber customers. In re Sherwin-Williams12 4 is an
example of the interaction between the price by use rule and dual
distributors. The diagram, in the footnote represents the relevant
portions of Sherwin-Williams' distribution system; 125 W4 represents
a dual distributor. The Federal Trade Commission ruled that W4
received an unfair advantage in regard to the products which it sold
through J4 by receiving price P14 for these products, as compared
to other competing jobbers (J1 and J5) who only received the job-
ber prices (P21 and P24). The Commission, however, did
not account for the different levels of distribution, comparing in-
stead only the prices P21, P24, and P14. As remedial action
it required Sherwin Williams to separately invoice all of its products
sold to dual distributors such that the dual distributor would only
receive the wholesale price (P14) for goods resold to jobbers
(such as J5). On the remaining sales by the dual distributor
at J4, the dual distributor was to receive only price P24. This
separate invoicing procedure has been applied with approval in
other Federal Trade Commission and court decisions.126
The legal solution of separate invoicing is economically un-
sound. The economic result is that the dual distributor is pen-
alized for its vertical integration of two levels within a distribu-
tion channel. The adverse economic effects can be seen in the
124. 36 F.T.C. 25 (1943).
125. Relevant portions of Sherwin-William's Distribution System.
Sherwin-Williams
P11 P14 P14
W1 W4
P21 P24 - [P24'] - - - -
31 35 3'4
P31 P35 P34
R's (Retailers)
126. See, e.g., FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 191 F.2d 786
(7th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952); American Oil Co. & Gen-
eral Fin., Inc., 29 F.T.C. 857 (1939); Albert L. Whiting, Trading as Urbana
Laboratories, 26 F.T.C. 312 (1938). See also Tyranny of Labels, supra note
41, at 592; CCH TRADE REG. REP. 3390.30, 3390.401, 29 FTC 584 (1939).
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Standard Oil litigation of the 1950's.1 27  Citrin-Kolb Corp. was
a jobber which purchased gasoline from Standard and resold the
gasoline to independent retailers. When the ownership of these
independent retail stations changed hands, Citrin usually assumed
the management of the stations during the interim period. For
short periods of time, therefore, Citrin was acting as a dual dis-
tributor. Due to the application of the price by use rule, Citrin
closed the retail stations to prevent its classification as a jobber
from being changed to that of a retailer.
The apparent reasons for the Federal Trade Commission's
continued application of the price by use rule are its ease of appli-
cation and its predictability when applied.' 28 The adverse effects
on competition caused by the price by use rule outweigh the ease
of administration and predictability of results. The market,
rather than the Federal Trade Commission, should determine the
most efficient distributiom system.' 29  Whether the distribution
system is one of non-integration, symmetrical integration, scram-
bled functions, or a mixture of all three, the free play of competi-
tive forces within the market, not legally imposed rules, should de-
termine the distribution system which is used. The price by use
rule ignores the performance of valid functions at each level of
distribution above the level at which the buyer is reselling. This
results in both sellers and buyers being reluctant to experiment
with methods of distribution which include either partial or total
vertical integration.
Uniform Price Rule
The uniform price rule, simply stated, means that a seller
can, with legal immunity, charge all of its buyers the same price
without regard to the cost of selling to each buyer.'80 A seller
contemplating the use of functional discounts in its distribution
system must contend with the previously discussed legal concepts
of cost justification, the indirect purchaser doctrine, and the price
by use rule. A logical solution to this dilemma is to charge every
buyer the same price because a uniform pricing policy insures
total immunity from legal liability under the Robinson-Patman
Act.
After involvement in price discrimination litigation, many
127. Note, Functional Discounts Under the Robinson-Patman Act: The
Standard Oil Litigation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 294, 306 (1953).
128. See Coase, supra note 85.
129. REPORT, supra note 10, at 208. See generally J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN,
FAIR COMPETITON: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRuST POLICY 251 (1954);
Kelley, Functional Discounts, supra note 3, at 526.
130. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
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firms have adopted a uniform pricing policy."' A uniform
price, however, is not necessarily an economically non-discrimi-
natory price. In all instances where buyers are performing
different functions for the seller with varying marginal costs, a
uniform pricing policy is economically discriminatory because
P,/MCI t P2/MC2 . 112  With the legally stimulated tendency
toward a uniform pricing policy, the only way a seller could avoid
economic price discrimination would be to vary each customer's
marginal cost so that P,/MC, = P2/MC 2. This result is impossible
because a buyer's marginal cost is independent of the seller's
control.
The difference between economic and legal injury caused by
a uniform price rule also hinders any experimentation within dis-
tribution markets. A seller cannot experiment with new distribu-
tion methods if it is pressured into a uniform pricing policy to
insure immunity from legal liability. This liability leads to ri-
gidity in distribution markets and, as a result, firms are not in-
duced to experiment with new distribution systems which require
different prices to different customers. 133
In comparison to a uniform pricing policy, an efficient eco-
nomic pricing policy would induce buyers to perform additional
functions and could result in the achievement of economies of
vertical integration through the performance of these functions.
Moreover, many economies of vertical integration are not imme-
diately achievable.' 3 4  The combined effect of the legal discour-
agement of partial vertical integration and the delayed effect of
achieving any economies from vertical integration results in a
negative inducement toward experimenting in distribution sys-
tems requiring partial integration.
A FINAL EVALUATION
The uniform price rule is pivotal to the problem of imple-
menting discounts because each of the other problem areas dis-
cussed tends to pressure a supplier into adopting such a uniform
pricing policy.1 5 Thus, in the price by use area, a seller legally
can ignore the separate invoicing requirement of dual distrib-
utors by charging all customers the same price. The economic
result, however, is that any advantages resulting from dual distrib-
131. EDWARDS, PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 9, at 338.
132. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 929 (1955)
(remarks by Jesse Markham) [hereinafter Markham, Hearings].
133. EDWARDS, PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 9, at 335; Markham, Hear-
ings 931.
134. EDWARDS, PilCE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 9, at 344.
135. See generally Dam, supra note 44, at 1, 13-14, 57, 61-62.
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ution and other vertically integrated distribution systems are
lost. All of the problems discussed in regard to the cost justifi-
cation defense can be ignored when a uniform pricing policy is
utilized because this pricing policy insures immunity from legal
liability. The uniform price rule and the indirect purchaser doc-
trine can be viewed as two sides of the same coin. Under the
indirect purchaser doctrine prices at two different levels of dis-
tribution are incorrectly compared without consideration of the
functions performed at the different distribution levels involved.
Under the uniform price rule the prices are equal, resulting in no
legal injury, yet different levels of distribution are again ignored.
It is apparent that this iron-clad rule permitting total legal
immunity under a uniform pricing policy is an unsatisfactory
answer to a complex problem. A more satisfactory procedure
entails the examination of each function performed at each level
and channel of distribution to determine the cost of the per-
formance of that function. Only after this more difficult deter-
mination has been made can it be determined whether a uniform
pricing policy is economically discriminatory.
One general recommendation is to properly define injury
by use of a procedure which consistently compares the same level
and channel of distribution. Prices from different channels and
levels of distribution cannot be correctly compared unless their
relative level and channel are taken into account. In the ensu-
ing discussion, two specific solutions to the functional discount
problem will be analyzed. First, the "due allowance" provision
of the cost justification defense could be read broadly to encom-
pass many previously ignored economic costs, such as a fair re-
turn on invested capital. If the cost of distribution capital were
included in the cost justification defense, a supplier would not
hesitate to experiment with new distribution methods which re-
quire additional capital. A second alternative to the present func-
tional discount theory is to accept a break in the causal chain
theory which negates the harm to competition requirement
of section 2(a).3 6 If the causal chain between discriminatory
price and injury were broken by consumption of the functional
discount by the buyer in the performance of those functions for
which the discount was granted, no legal injury would have oc-
curred. Performance of the services should be required of the
buyer and the functional discount should include a reasonable prof-
it for the performance of his services. Functional discounts so
offered would have to be available equally to all buyers who qual-
ify for such discounts.
136. See generally Comment, Price Discrimination, supra note 93.
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A firm within a distribution channel will not perform a func-
tion unless the cost of performing the function internally is less
than the market cost.13 7  Without the legal acceptance of func-
tional discounts, a seller cannot grant a discount for the perform-
ance of the function and thus reduce the buyer's internal price be-
low the buyer's market price. A denial of compensation for the
performance of a particular function would result in the total ab-
sorption of the cost of performance of the function by the buyer.
The buyer will in all likelihood refuse to perform the function
because the market price (its cost) will be lower than its internal
cost. This results in effectively barring a seller from using func-
tional discounts to experiment with new distribution methods and
forcing him to remain bound to an existing, possibly inefficient,
distribution system. Functional discounts, however, can be very
useful in experimenting with new distribution systems.
A seller may "buy distribution" by granting various func-
tional discounts to different classes of buyers,1 8 and thereby
induce competition. Buying distribution is an effective way to ex-
periment with new distribution but, as seen in the previous dis-
cussion, sellers have great difficulty inducing buyers to perform
additional functions (i.e., buying distribution) without the aid of
functional discounts. The present functional discount case law
creates differences in the legal and economic definitions of in-
jury which results in firms being discouraged, rather than en-
couraged, to experiment with new distribution methods. The
Federal Trade Commission and the courts should encourage
functional discounts as a means of improving economic distribu-
tion. Such a change in the present legal view would enable the
distribution channels to operate more efficiently, would stimulate
competition, and would encourage innovative methods of distribu-
tion, thereby benefiting all participants in the economic market-
place.
137. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
138. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
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